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Abstract 
The European Union project, Single European Sky, initiated a reorganization of European 
airspace and proposed additional measures for air traffic management to achieve the key 
objectives of improving efficiency and capacity while at the same time enhancing safety. The 
concept of multiple remote tower operation is that air traffic controllers (ATCOs) can control 
several airfields from a distant virtual control centre. The control of multiple airfields can be 
centralised to a virtual centre permitting the more efficient use of ATCO resources. This 
research was sponsored by the Single European Sky ATM Research Program and the ATM 
Operations Division of the Irish Aviation Authority. A safety case was developed for 
migration of multiple remote tower services to live operations.   This research conducted 50 
large scale demonstration trials of remote tower operations from single tower operations to 
multiple tower operations for safety assessment by air navigation safety regulators in 2016.  A 
dedicated team of air traffic controllers and technology experts successfully completed the 
safety assessment of multiple remote tower operations in real time. The air movement control 
and surface movement control at both Shannon and Cork airports were conducted 
simultaneously from a virtual remote tower centre at Dublin Airport, Ireland. The 
implementation of this innovative technology requires a careful balance between cost-
efficiency and the safety of the air traffic control in terms of capacity and human performance. 
The live trial exercises demonstrated that the air traffic services provided by the remote tower 
for a single airport and two medium airports by a single ATCO with ‘in sequence’ and 
‘simultaneous’ aircraft operations was at least as safe as provided by the local towers at Cork 
and Shannon aerodromes. No safety occurrence was reported nor did any operational safety 
issue arise during the conduct of the fifty live trial exercises.  
Keywords: Air Traffic Control, Cost Efficiency, Human Performance, Multiple Remote 
Tower Operations, Safety Assessment, Single European Sky 
 
  
1. Introduction 
The initial concept of remote tower operations was started by the research proposal of Virtual 
Control Tower over 20 years ago (Kraiss & Kuhlen, 1996). The paradigm of remote tower 
operations will allow air traffic services (ATS) be delivered remotely without direct 
observation from a local tower. The emerging technology of remote towers developed slowly 
during the early stages but in recent times has taken a leap forward with some single airport 
virtual tower operations. SeaRidge technologies in partnership with HungaroControl have 
secured certification for the provision of remote tower live operations without restrictions; 
SAAB has provided London City airport with its digital tower platform to begin its landmark 
replacement of the conventional tower with remote solution. Norway’s air navigation service 
provider Avinor has collaborated with Indra, Navia and Kongsberg to implement remote 
tower provision at up to fifteen low density airports from one central location (Otsby, 2016). 
Italian air navigation services providers ENAV successfully tested “Remote Airport Concept 
of Operation” (RACOON) which validated multiple mode operations at Milan Linate airport 
from Milan Malpensa (SESAR, 2016).  Additionally, remote tower operations to medium size 
aerodromes were demonstrated by DFS at Saarbrücken Airport and by LVNL for Eelde 
Airport in active as well as in passive shadow mode based on operational procedures used in 
their respective conventional towers (SESAR, 2015a). 
The development of Augmented Vision Video-panorama technologies has increased the 
monitoring capabilities of remote tower operations (RTO). Both monitoring and 
communication are important tasks of ATCOs, the concept of MRTO raised a safety concern 
of human performance in  higher traffic environments (Papenfuss & Friedrich, 2016). The 
identification of visual properties used by ATCOs to monitor aircraft for landing and 
manoeuvring at airports are critical to aviation safety. ATCO’s use Out the Window 
visualisation (OTW) supported by radar data processing (RDP), electronic flight strips (EFS) 
and a communications network (TEL) to provide air traffic services in the airfield 
environment (Ellis & Liston, 2016). It is likely that ATCOs’ monitoring performance is 
influenced by the system design of remote tower centre (RTC) and the performance of 
multiple tasks simultaneously would require the sharing of cognitive resources of the 
controllers. The concept of distributed cognition seeks to understand the structure of cognitive 
system and extends the application to encompass interactions between resources and 
information in the operational environment (Hollan, Hutchins, & Kirsh, 2000). The 
motivations of this research are to understand the limitations of controlling simultaneous 
traffic patterns at two airports by a single ATCO, to demonstrate how the implementation of 
the advanced technology impacts safety, capacity and human performance, and how to 
conduct safety assessment of MRTO in order to secure regulatory approval for live operations. 
Based on the concept of remote tower operations, multiple remote tower operations (MRTO) 
offer further solutions for cost efficiency of air traffic services for small and medium size of 
airports. The new technology will allow one air traffic controller (ATCO) control two or more 
airports at the same time during low traffic volumes. The feasibility of controlling two 
airports simulataneosuly was demonstrated successfully with a special focus on the visual 
attention of ATCOs and the controller working position design (CWP) related to ATS task 
(Moehlenbrink & Papenfuss, 2011). 
 
2. Background of Policy and Practice 
This Multiple Remote Towers research was sponsored by the Single European Sky ATM 
Research Program (SESAR) and the ATM Operations Division of the Irish Aviation 
Authority. The Remote Tower Centre (RTC) was located at Dublin Air Traffic Services Unit 
in excess of 100 nautical miles away from the two airports at Shannon and Cork where the 
services were provided simultaneously (figure 1).  Cork airport is a H24 international airport 
with aircraft types up to medium weight category such as Boeing 737 and Airbus 320. Total 
movements in 2016 were 50,242. Shannon is a H24 international airport with aircraft types up 
to the heavy weight category such as Airbus A330, it handled 25,059 movements in 2016. 
This research will contribute to the objectives for in sequence and simultaneous remote 
provision of ATS for multiple aerodromes as outlined in the Operational Improvement Step 
(OIS) SDM-0205 linked to SESAR Work Package (WP) 06.09.03 of the EU ATM Master 
Plan.   
 
 
Figure 1. The Remote Tower Centre located at Dublin Airport in excess of 100 miles away 
provided air traffic services for both Cork and Shannon airports 
 
2.1 The Evolution of Remote Tower Operation 
Air traffic in Europe has consistently increased since the 1990s. The Single European Sky 
(SES) initiated a reorganization of European airspace based on traffic flows instead of 
national boundaries and proposed additional measures for air traffic management to achieve 
key objectives of enhanced efficiency and capacity while improving safety performance. SES 
regulations focussed on efficiency, capacity and safety have increased cost pressure on air 
navigation service providers and require them to be more innovative in their approach to the 
provision of air traffic management services.  Many air navigation service providers (ANSPs) 
have developed automated systems using video-panorama cameras for synthetic outside view, 
to increase capacity at airports and to improve cost efficiency by minimising personnel to 
meet cost efficiency targets (Leitner & Oehme, 2016). This has seen increased attention in 
remote tower research over the last 20 years. The concept of remote tower operations is that 
an ATCO can control any airfield from a distant virtual control centre. The view of the 
airfield under control is displayed in real time on screens and air traffic movements can be 
controlled. This concept is predominantly appropriate for the lower volume airports. 
Therefore, the control of multiple airfields can be centralised permitting capital and 
operational costs savings. Consequently, the visual features of cues and objects which ATCOs 
must identify for safe operations are significant influencers of the requirements for 
surveillance cameras, data-communication links and display systems in a remote tower centre 
(Van Schaik, Roessingh, Lindqvist, & Falt, 2016). The concept of an advanced remote tower 
was developed for airports with fewer than 25 movements at the mean busy hours with a mix 
of visual flight rules and instrument flight rules. Technology advances can facilitate the 
image-video resolution for visual detection but not for recognition.  
The German Aerospace Centre also has evaluated the metrics of aircraft on Dutch roll, Route, 
Decline, Landing light, Flight path and Gear status to evaluate the performance of ATCOs’ 
visual identification by remote tower module. To test the feasibility of the RTO concept, V-2 
feasibility of human-in-the-loop have been conducted and validated for single remote tower 
operations (Friedrich & Mohlenbrink, 2013; Friedrich, 2016). NextGen is concerned with the 
diverse aspects of tower control including human-computer interaction, situation awareness, 
cost of airport control tower, safety management and capacity variation (Federal Aviation 
Administration, 2012). NASA has also examined remote tower operations by studying 
alternative approaches for improving runway safety at Los Angeles International Airport 
(LAX) under future flight central program (Dorighi & Rabin, 2002). The preliminary research 
demonstrated that remote tower operations can provide substantial economic benefits 
compared to the traditional operations of local air traffic control towers, as NextGen proposed 
an innovative concept to address airport capacity problem by introducing an integrated tower 
information display providing weather and surveillance data as decision support tools (Nene, 
2008).  The concept of remote towers exhibited encouraging improvements in 
communications and departure rates with no differences in perceived workload, effort, safety 
and situation awareness (Nickelson, Jones, & Zimmerman, 2011). This option may offer 
operational cost saving, and the level of services provided to pilots operating under visual 
flight rules might be reduced. 
 
2.2 The Cost Efficiency of Multiple Remote Tower Operation 
Multiple Remote Tower Operations is an alternative solution to enhance safety and capacity at 
small/medium airports in a cost efficient manner. This new technology allows one ATCO 
control one or more small airports from a remote location without direct visualization of the 
airport under their control (Fürstenau, 2016). Furthermore, the building and operational costs 
of remote tower facilities is much lower compared with a traditional physical tower. However, 
there is a trend of growing concern by safety regulators as to how human performance is 
managed using these new technologies. There is a requirement to develop a safety case and 
address concerns that multiple remote tower operations may increase operational risk for 
ATCOs (SESAR Joint Undertaking, 2013, 2015b). 
Over 75% of regional airports with lower than one million passengers are currently making a 
loss.  Cost of ATC services present the major portion of a regional airport’s overall operating 
costs. The operational services of regional airports are similar, so the costs can be shared by 
relocation of the ATC function of two or more airports to a shared facility of multiple remote 
tower centre. The introduction of multiple remote tower operations is mainly driven by a 
desire  reduce ATS operational costs in order to meet Single European Sky cost reduction 
requirements. However, the SESAR assessment report of remote tower for multiple airports 
added additional safety specifications as requirements (Ziegler, 2016). IAA has conducted an 
analysis of the total costs of building and operating a physical tower by compared with the 
costs of remote tower. The result demonstrated that remote tower operations reduces costs 
significantly on the buildings, infrastructure and operational manpower  in the order of €1.3 
million per year (table 1). Furthermore, Federal Aviation Administration (2012) revealed that 
the construction of a single control tower under federal contract might take three to five years 
with approximately $4.2 million  plus the average annual operational costs and maintenance 
costs of $185,000 and several hundred thousand dollars for annual controllers’ compensation. 
 
Table 1: The comparison of cost-efficiency between existing tower and remote tower 
 Build Equipment Manpower 
Traditional 
Tower 
Roughly cost £12M to Build. 
To assume 10% annual running 
cost for the building is 
reasonable £1.2M a year. 
Usual Communications, 
Navigation, Surveillance and 
Flight Data Processing 
Systems.  
Typical manning is 8 to 10 
staff per H24 position. 
Remote 
Tower  
Build costs will reduce 
significantly as only a mast 
needed to house the cameras. 
Estimated cost of mast £2M 
saving £10M. 
To assume 10% annual running 
cost for the Mast is reasonable 
e.g.  £200K a year saving 
£800K a year. 
In summary if the tower is 
depreciated over 30 years, 
saving is (12-2)/30 = £333K in 
CAPEX, plus £800K in OPEX 
so £1.33M a year. 
Additional CAPEX is £2M. If 
the remote tower system is 
depreciated over 8 years, 
additional costs is 2/8 = £250K 
in CAPEX, plus £200K in 
OPEX so £450K a year.  
There should be potential to 
save on some of the 
Communications, Navigation, 
Surveillance and Flight Data 
Processing Systems Costs via 
centralisation which will offset 
some of the increase in network 
costs.  
Remote Towers will facilitate 
staffing efficiencies. The 
objective is to crew to 
workload such that 
operational staff are always 
busy within allowable safety 
limits. 
For the IAA example of Cork 
and Shannon controlled from 
Dublin we anticipated a 
saving of 4 ATCO’s or 
£400K a year. 
 
2.3 Safety Assessment of Multiple Remote Tower Operations 
The Safety Assessment Report for Multiple Remote Towers (SESAR Joint Undertaking, 
2015b) contemplated the availability of surveillance data to support ATCOs task performance 
in bad weather conditions (Ziegler, 2016). The IAA ANSP as sponsor and project coordinator 
is the ANS provider for Dublin, Cork and Shannon airports. The Dublin Airport Authority 
(DAA) as the airport operator for Cork Airport and Stobart Air are an international commuter 
airline. The Shannon Airport Authority (SAA) was involved as a stakeholder. A 
Demonstration Plan was prepared to describe how the live trial exercises would be organised, 
conducted, supervised, and assessed. This plan focused on safety, capacity, cost efficiency 
and human performance concerns. The safety case report is a structured argument, supported 
by a body of evidence that provides a compelling, comprehensible and valid case that a 
system is safe for a given application in a given environment. It provides a comprehensive 
and structured set of safety documentation which is aimed to ensure that the safety of a 
specific system or equipment is safe for operational deployment. It will also establish the 
requirements for safety monitoring following transition into operation and for the entire life 
cycle of the system through to decommissioning (European Aviation Safety Agency, 2014, 
2015b). 
For delivery of a safety argument for approval the IAA project team developed a “safety case” 
by applying the Eurocontrol safety assessment methodology (SAM) to provide safety 
assurance that the introduction of any new technological systems or changes to these systems 
are proven to be tolerably safe for service provision. The safety assessment methodology of 
current research follows a structured step wise process as followings (figure 2);  
(1) Safety Plan defines a safety programme that is planned, integrated and developed in 
conjunction with other design, development, production and quality control activities. 
It details safety activity timelines and deliverable in accordance with the higher project 
plan. It requires regulatory endorsement and approval.  
(2) Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA) records the functions to be performed by the 
system, the effects of identified hazards on operations, including assessment of the 
severity of the hazards effects and also records the derived safety objectives, i.e. 
determines their acceptability in terms of the hazards maximum frequency of 
occurrence, derived from the maximum frequency of the hazards effects.  
(3) Preliminary System Safety Assessment (PSSA) produces Safety Requirements and 
Assurance Levels for the system elements and records the evidence, arguments and 
assumptions to verify that the proposed solution will meet its Safety Requirements. It 
also provides the arguments to support the claim that the system will not affect the 
safety of the ATM system during installation and commissioning.  
(4) System Safety Assessment (SSA) records the evidence, arguments and assumptions to 
verify and validate that the system design configuration will meet its Safety 
Requirements. It also describes specific operating and maintenance requirements 
necessary to assure safety and provides arguments to support the claim that the system 
will not affect the safety of ATM during the transition to operational use. In addition, 
the SSA provides details of the Transition Plan for introducing the system into service.  
 
 Figure 2. Safety assessment Methodology applied by IAA Terminal Services 
 
 
2.4 The Processes of Regulatory Approval for Practical Implementation 
The regulatory body responsible for the regulation of aviation in Europe is the European 
Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) based in Cologne, Germany with offices in Brussels. It has 
been providing safety regulation for member states in Europe since 2002. It is an agent of the 
European Union, its mission is to ensure the highest common level of safety protection in 
aviation for EU citizens.  EC Regulation 549 /2004 ‘The Article-4 of Framework Regulation 
mandates that each European Communities State establish a National Supervisory Authority 
(NSA) with responsibilities for the supervision and safety oversight of Air Navigation Service 
Providers which provide air traffic control, airspace management and air traffic flow 
management services (Pellegrini & Rodriguez, 2013). The Irish Department of Transport 
(DoT) have designated the Safety Regulation Division (SRD) of the Irish Aviation Authority 
as the NSA for Ireland with Aeronautical Services Department (ASD) specifically charged 
with the oversight of all ANSP’s nationally. External oversight of the IAA is carried out by 
two independent bodies, namely; the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) a body 
of the United Nations (UN), who conduct safety oversight audits of all States' safety 
regulation authorities worldwide and EASA, who routinely audit the IAA regulatory Body. In 
accordance with internal ANSP safety processes the safety case report was submitted to its 
safety management unit (SMU) to ensure all evidence and arguments were met and that all 
identified hazards and their subsequent effects were assessed, documented and safety 
requirements implemented prior to operational usage of the multiple remote tower concept. 
Any open issues were highlighted and detailed in the safety case report ahead of the trial 
being conducted. During the trial, safety levels were monitored by the implementation of a 
shadow operation whereby the actual towers of Cork and Shannon were manned by 
appropriately qualified and competent controllers while service delivery was being provided 
from Dublin RTC (European Aviation Safety Agency, 2014; SESAR Joint Undertaking, 
2015b).  
Safety Regulatory approval would be dependent upon the provision of evidence of in service 
trials which, this evidence was collected through the deployment of large scale demonstration 
(LSD) trials of remote tower operations for multiple airports. These involved the provision of 
air traffic services at two airports at the same time utilising innovative technological solutions. 
A dedicated team of operations and technology experts completed 50 trials demonstrating 
multiple remote tower operations in real time, specifically, air movement control (AMC) and 
surface movement control (SMC) at Shannon and Cork airports simultaneously from the 
remote tower centre at Dublin Airport. Trials were only permitted following the submission of 
a detailed and comprehensive safety argument, submitted by Terminal Services Operations 
(European Aviation Safety Agency, 2015a; SESAR Joint Undertaking, 2013) to the Irish 
National Supervisory Authority. 
 
3. Methodology of Large Scale Demonstration 
The large scale demonstration of multiple remote tower operations was provided in sequence 
or simultaneously for both Cork and Shannon airports during periods of low traffic density 
building on the SESAR solution package for remote tower for single and multiple airports. 
Out the window visualisation supported by radar and electronic strip technology and the 
existing data and communications network will provide the necessary environment for the 
provision of ATS remotely and without degradation. The project was supported by a safety 
case which was approved by the NSA for Ireland. Fifty live trial exercises involving up to 500 
aircraft were conducted between June and September 2016.  
3.1 Participants 
Three qualified and licensed air traffic controllers holding appropriate ratings on both Cork 
and Shannon airports participated in the live trial demonstrations in accordance with (EU) 
805/2011 and EASA NPA 2015-04. SAAB systems provided familiarisation and HMI 
training on the RTC CWP and ATCOs were certificated accordingly. Train the trainer 
certificates were  granted to specialists in IAA. This training combined in conjunction with 
the training specified in all relevant aspects of the RTC including the electronic strip system 
continued up to the demonstration commencement date. The approval of Science and 
Engineering Research Ethics Committee was granted (CURES/1506/2016) in advance of the 
research taking place.  
3.2 Apparatus 
3.2.1 Remote Tower Module (RTM): This project applied Saab’s remote tower systems 
consisting of a camera array, pan/tilt/zoom (PTZ) cameras and signal light guns (SLG) at 
Cork and Shannon airports controlled from a Remote Tower Centre (RTC) at Dublin ATS 
unit. The RTC is provided with Out the Window visualisation (OTW), Electronic Flight Strip 
(EFS) System and an air/ground and ground/ground voice communication system (TEL) for 
the appropriate Cork and Shannon VHF frequencies and sector coordination function 
respectively (Figure 3). The RTC contained two panoramic OTW display comprised by 15 
full HD LED display screens (14 active & 1 spare) which provide a panoramic 360 degree 
view of the selected airport and its surrounding airspace in a 208 degree configuration. 
Therefore, one ATCO could provide services for both Cork and Shannon using one OTW 
display.  
 
 
Figure 3. Remote Tower Centre OPS Room and Test & Validation Room 
 The OTW displays are normally used to present the images from the 14 cameras, while the 
last display is a stand-by unit in the event of equipment failure. The displays match the 
camera resolution of 1920x1080 pixels, and have a refresh rate of at least 60Hz. The displays 
are mounted in portrait mode to match the portrait-mounted cameras. The PTZ cameras 
controlled from RTC allow the ATCO a 30 times zoom (optical), 90 degrees up and 80 
degrees down tilt, panning 360 degrees and selection of pre-defined sweeps and/or positions. 
The PTZ view is displayed on the OTW display (Figure 4). Each RTM is equipped with the 
Saab’s e-Strip which consists of a top bar, a vehicle map, a strip board and a bottom bar. The 
top bar contains a settings dialogs for changing role and runway combination, as well as 
certain status information. The top bar also contains two buttons that will open side windows 
which are toolboxes from where new strips can be created and old strips can be recovered. 
The bottom bar contains a slider for adjusting the screen brightness. A vehicle map displays a 
graphical view of the runway and taxiway. Vehicles can be added, removed to/from the 
vehicle map or moved within the vehicle map. The radar target tracking presents information 
from the radar display as an overlay in the visual presentation, linked with the visual tracking. 
This enables the aircraft to be tracked with label attached providing radar information 
including call sign and altitude providing additional support to visual observation. The Flight 
Data Processing (FDP) includes the display of messages accessed by a pull down display on 
top of the visualisation display. Data displayed includes Flight Plan information and 
NOTAMS. 
 
Figure 4. Controller Working Position (CWP) and Out of the Windows (OTW) screens of 
Remote Tower Module in RTC 
 
3.2.2 Eye Tracking Device: The device of collecting ATCOs’ visual behaviours is a light, 
mobile, head-mounted eye tracker developed by Pupil Lab. It allows participants to freely 
move their head and is composed of two cameras, one focused on the pupil and the other one 
the environment. Both cameras can be moved to accurately get eye detection and the pilot 
field of vision. The software used to record data is Pupil Capture 9.3 and the one used to 
process data is Pupil Player 9.3, both from the same company as the headset. The set-up of the 
eye camera is a 640x480 resolution for a 60 frames rate. The world camera is a 1280x720 
with a frame rate of 30, however due to computer limitation, this frame rate can be flexible 
due to the volume of data processing and is not constant over time. The cameras are 
adjustable to suit different participant’s facial layout and track their pupil parameters 
accordingly (Kassner, Patera, & Bulling, 2014). 
3.3 Safety Case for 50 Live Exercises 
The Safety Case for multiple remote tower live trials followed the SESAR standard four-part 
safety case approach beginning with the production of a safety plan. This framework outlines 
the safety case activities to be conducted for the entire Remote Tower System (people, 
procedures, and equipment), the specific deliverables applicable and the timescale for 
submission to the NSA. This was followed by the production of a functional hazard analysis 
which formed the basis for the setting of safety objectives and requirements for the system. A 
preliminary system safety assessment document was then developed leading to a final system 
safety assessment. Each deliverable was submitted to the NSA as it reached maturity. A 
hazard log was also developed which remained open for the duration of 50 live exercises so 
that any previously unidentified hazards could be recorded and mitigated appropriately.  
General requirements regarding traffic scenarios were defined in the demonstration plan as 
well as the selection of Cork and Shannon airports. Traffic parameters such as traffic flows, 
depart/arrival ratio, visual flight/instrumental flights are realistic at both airports. The 
demonstration plan also described the success criteria for each live exercise and how the 50 
live exercises were further divided into three batches. The first batch of exercises (numbers 1 
to 5) had the objective of familiarising operational and technical personnel with the 
procedures to be used, and the environment in which they will be operating for SMC (table 2). 
The second batch of exercises (numbers 6 to 20) had the objective of demonstrating the 
applicability of integrated SMC and AMC operations with incrementally increased traffic 
movements mixing arrivals and departures at both Cork and Shannon airports. Flexibility in 
the timing of exercises was applied to maximise the variability of scenarios to be used with 
regard to runway in use, type of approach (instrument or visual). During this phase the 
simultaneous scenario (Cork and Shannon) was introduced with low traffic movements (table 
3).  A further 30 exercises (numbers 21 to 50) were conducted with the objective of building 
on the experience gained from previous exercises with increased traffic movements as 
appropriate in the sequenced and simultaneous scenarios (table 4). 
Table 2: The description of batch-1 live exercises 1-5  
Exercise 
Id 
Exercise Description 
001 Shannon (SNN) SMC only in Module RTM-A1 
002 Cork (CRK) SMC only in Module RTM-A2 
003 Control of SNN SMC in RTM-A1 & Cork SMC in RTM-A2 
004 CRK SMC first then SNN SMC combined on a single position 
005 CRK SMC in RTWR A2 SNN SMC in RTWR 1 with different screen configuration to 
exercise 003 
 
Table 3: The description of batch-1 live exercises 6-20  
Exercise 
Id 
Exercise Description  
006 Control of SNN SMC in RTM-A1 & Cork SMC in RTM-A2  
007 Control of SNN SMC & SNN AMC from a single position in RTM-A1. No Cork Positions. 
008 Control of SNN AMC & SNN SMC in RTM-A1 and Cork SMC in RTM-A2 
009 Continuation of exercise 08. Hand back CRK and split SNN SMC onto RTM-A2 
010 Control of SMC & AMC from a single position RTM-A1.  
011 Control of SNN AMC in RTM-A1. Cork AMC in RTM-A2 
012 Merge SNN AMC and Cork AMC in RTM-A2 This exercise is a continuation of exercise 11 
whereby we kept control of both SNN & CRK AMC Roles but merged them onto a single 
position thereby making this exercise the first time Multiple AMC Control was performed 
from a single Remote Tower position. 
013 Control of SNN AMC in RTM-A1 and CRK AMC in RTM-A2 
The plan is to merge the two positions as soon as traffic allows 
014 Control of SNN AMC in RTM-A1. Cork AMC in RTM-A2. 
015 Control of SNN AMC in RTM-A1. CRK AMC in RTM-A2 
Later SNN and CRK AMC combined in RTM-A2 
016 Control of SNN AMC RTM-A1 CRK AMC RTM-A2 
Later SNN & CRK AMC combined in RTM-A1 
017 Control of SNN AMC in RTM-A1. CRK AMC in RTM-A2 
Later SNN & CRK AMC combined in RTM-A2 
018 Control of SNN AMC in RTM-A1. CRK AMC in RTM-A2.  
019 Control of SNN & CRK AMC combined in RTM-A2 
020 Control of SHA AMC in RTM-A1. No Control of CRK AMC due to Low visibility in Cork 
which needed to be aware before actively Controlling in these conditions.   
 
Table 4: The description of batch-3 live exercises 21-50  
Exercise 
Id 
Exercise Description  
021 Control of SNN AMC in RTM-A1. CRK AMC in RTM-A2 initially then later in the exercise 
SNN & CRK AMC combined in RTM-A2 
022 Control of SNN AMC in RTM-A1 CRK AMC in RTM-A2 initially then later in the exercise 
SNN & CRK AMC combined in RTM-A2 
023 Control of SNN & CRK AMC combined in RTMA1 
024 Control of SNN AMC in RTM-A1 CRK AMC in RTM-A2 
Later SNN & CRK AMC combined in RTM-A2 
025 Continuation of exercise 024. Control of SNN & CRK AMC combined in RTM-A2 
026 Control of SNN AMC in RTM-A1 CRK AMC in RTM-A2 initially then later in the exercise 
SNN & CRK AMC combined in RTM-A2 
027 Control of SNN AMC in RTM-A1 CRK AMC in RTM-A2 initially then later in the exercise 
SNN & CRK AMC combined in RTM-A2 
028 Control of SNN & CRK AMC combined in RTM-A2 
029 Control of SNN & CRK AMC combined in RTM-A2 
030 Control of SNN & CRK AMC combined in RTM-A2 
031 Control of SNN & CRK AMC combined in RTM-A2 
032 Control of SNN & CRK AMC combined in RTM-A1 
Control of SNN & CRK SMC combined in RTM-A2 initially then later in the exercise Control 
of SNN & CRK AMC & SMC combined in RTM-A2 
033 Control of SNN AMC in RTM-A1. CRK AMC  in RTM-A2 initially then later in the exercise 
SNN and CRK AMC combined in RTM-A2 
034 Control of SNN & CRK AMC combined in RTM-A2  
035 Control of SNN AMC in RTM-A1 CRK AMC in RTM-A2  initially then later in the exercise 
SNN & CRK AMC combined in RTM-A2  
036 Control of SNN AMC& SMC in RTM-B2 
Control of CRK AMC& SMC in RTM-A2 
037 Control of SNN & CRK AMC & SMC combined in RTM-A2   
038 Control of SNN AMC in RTM-A1, then Control of SNN SMC in RTM-A2 
Next series of exercises is to follow the progression of workload starting with 2 Controllers at 
one airport and in the next exercise moving to 1 Controller per airport. 
039 Control of SNN AMC& SMC in RTM-B2 
Control of CRK AMC& SMC in RTM-A2 
040 Control of SNN & CRK AMC & SMC combined in RTM-A2 
041 Control of SNN & CRK AMC & SMC combined in RTM-A2 
042 Control of CRK SMC in RTM-A1 & CRK AMC in RTM-A2 
043 Control of SNN SMC in RTM-A1 SNN AMC in RTM-A2 
044 Control of SNN and CRK AMC combined in RTM-A2 
045 Control of SNN and CRK AMC combined in RTM-A2 
046 Continuation of Ex.45 Control of SNN and CRK AMC combined in RTM-A2 
047 Control of SNN and CRK AMC combined in RTM-A2 
048 Control of SNN and CRK AMC combined in RTM-A2 
049 Control of SNN AMC on RTA 1 and CRK AMC combined in RTM-A2 initially then later in 
the exercise Control of SNN & CRK AMC & SMC combined in RTM-A2 
050 Control of SNN & CRK AMC & SMC combined in RTM-A2 
 
3.4 Procedures of Exercise Implementation 
IAA normal operational practice if to apply fully redundant systems and data lines for stand-
alone operations (figure 5). This required a procedure commencing 20 minutes before transfer 
of Control from the local tower to the remote tower module and involved ATCOs cross 
checking information from Local Tower aircraft information strips against information on 
electronic strips at the RTM. This was initiated and completed through a phone call from the 
Remote Tower. The cross check also permitted the co-ordination of information on aircraft 
stand allocations, transponder codes and any upcoming local training details by training 
school aircraft on Cork airport.  These cross checks were followed by a detailed handover of 
position(s) to the Remote Tower ATCO in accordance with current IAA operational position 
handover procedures including briefing on the current weather data, airfield lighting status 
and nav-aid status (10 Minutes before transfer of Control).  Main air traffic control radio 
frequencies were deselected on the COMPAD communications system in the local tower who 
then temporarily reverted to operations via the Radio Backup System. This was to avoid 
simultaneous transmissions from two locations on a single transmitter which may cause 
transmitter failure.  
A project consortium was established to ensure all aspects of relevant aviation activity was 
represented in the project. The project team consisted of Project Manager, an ATM Specialist, 
a Human Factors Expert and two appropriately rated Controllers who were present for the live 
trials.  During the trials the following types of information was collected: (1) Exercise date 
and time; (2) Tower roles assumed in the RTC; (3) Exercise participants; (4) Weather at both 
airports; (5) Aircraft involved in each exercise and the timing (to the second) of events to 
record what actions a controller was conducting during each minute; (6) collecting ATCOs’ 
eye movements and the debrief observations; (7) Aircraft involved in the exercise as well as 
recording notes on non-normal aircraft movements e.g. simulated engine failure or touch & go; 
(8) Completing the initial assessment of the controller impression of various aspects; (9) 
Compiling unexpected behaviour/results and recommendations. 
 
 Figure 5. Video-Data Communications Links of Multiple Remote Towers Protected by IPsec 
for Data Confidentiality, Integrity and Authentication between Participating Peers 
 
4. Results of Large Scale Demonstrations 
The results of this research demonstrate that advanced remote technology based on human-
centered design has improved ATCO’s performance in monitoring and controlling more 
aircraft from two different airports. OTW design permits the adjustment of the percentage of 
the selected airports on the screens based on ATCO’s preference, but they are also able to 
zoom-in by PTZ to enhance visual searching.  Furthermore, OTW allows different colours to 
distinguish different airports, in this case green for Cork and red for Shannon, further 
increasing ATCO’s situation awareness to which airport he/she is engaging. The EFS system 
integrates aircraft strip information with the map of runway and taxiway, providing the ATCO 
a clear picture of the locations of the moving targets. If an ATCO has permitted one aircraft to 
enter a runway, he/she will not be able to permit another aircraft moving to enter the same 
runway with this EFS. This is a very effective design to prevent runway incursions. The 
information presented by the RDP can facilitate ATCO in predicting the flow of traffic and 
landing time at each airport, thereby facilitating enhanced decision making in respect of 
simultaneous movements at both airports.  
 
4.1 Eye Scan Patterns of Single ATCO Performing Multiple Operations 
ATCOs’ eye movements across four areas of interests (AOIs) including RDP, EFS, TEL and 
OTW were analysed while performing multiple tasks. A series of ANOVAs with four AOIs 
(RDP, EFS, TEL, and OTW) to assess single ATCO’s eye movement patterns on multiple 
remote tower operations. The response variables are fixation count (FC), fixation duration 
(FD), saccade amplitude (SA), and pupil size (PS) shown as table 5. 
4.1.1 Fixation duration: The assumption of sphericity is violated (Mauchly’s W = .380, p 
< .001), therefore the Greenhouse-Geisser is applied to adjust the univariate test. Results 
indicated no significant main effect of AOIs, F (1.843, 60.823) = 2.192, p > .05. 
4.1.2 Fixation count: The assumption of sphericity is violated (Mauchly’s W = .682, p 
< .05), therefore the Greenhouse-Geisser is applied to adjust the univariate test. A significant 
main effect of AOIs, F (2.511, 85.373) = 22.385, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .397 was found. Post-hoc 
comparison on AOI revealed RDP is larger than EFS and TEL (ps < .001). Moreover, OTW is 
smaller than EFS (p < .001) and TEL (p < .001). 
4.1.3 Saccade amplitude: The assumption of sphericity is not violated (Mauchly’s W = .966, 
p > .05), therefore no adjustment is required for the univariate test. A significant main effect 
of AOIs, F (3, 87) = 30.346, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .511 was found. Post-hoc comparison on AOI 
revealed OTW is larger than RDP, EFS, and TEL (ps < .001). 
4.1.4 Pupil size: The assumption of sphericity is violated (Mauchly’s W = .377, p < .001), 
therefore the Greenhouse-Geisser is applied to adjust the univariate test. A significant main 
effect of AOIs, F (2.040, 67.330) = 11.687, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .262  was found. Post-hoc 
comparison on AOI revealed RDP is larger than EFS (p < .001). Moreover, TEL is larger than 
EFS (p < .001) and OTW (p < .001). 
 
Table 5. Descriptive statistics of mean and standard deviation of four eye movement 
parameters among four AOIs 
Tasks Visual 
Parameters 
FC 
N=35 
FD 
N=34 
SA 
N=30 
PS 
N=34 
 
 
RDP 46.74(25.036) .269(.069) 55.461(30.958) 81.460(7.500) 
EFS 21.40(16.784) .232(.060) 79.990(33.047) 77.062(10.441) 
TEL 13.74(14.189) .293(.156) 62.759(38.502) 85.232(14.080) 
OTW 43.97(18.698) .275(.075) 131.211(28.777) 79.572(8.189) 
 
 
 
 
4.2 Findings of Large Scale Demonstration on Multiple Tower Operations 
The concept of remote tower operations has been addressed as a suitable solution and is being 
developed in many countries. This research provided scientific evidence that multiple remote 
tower operations can achieve the objectives of Single European Sky ATM Research program. 
For the MRTO validation campaign, simultaneous landing and take-off at both airports are 
identified as traffic situations that should be examined further to explore the standards of safe 
operations and acceptable workload to ensure optimum ATCO task performance. During the 
trials no critical safety issues were identified by the team or other stakeholders such as pilots, 
or airport vehicles drivers. The trials provide one indication that multiple remote tower 
operations from an RTM can provide an acceptable level of safety (ALOS). A summary of 
operational results based on the 50 live exercises of multiple remote tower operations 
described as follows (table 6). 
4.2.1 Batch-1 live trials: The first batch, exercises 1 to exercise 5, focus on Surface 
Movement Control which is the air traffic control service provided to aircraft, vehicles and 
personnel on the manoeuvring areas of Cork and Shannon airports excluding the runway in 
use. In certain cases, the SMC controller may provide an advisory service to aircraft on the 
aerodrome apron. The first batch of 5 exercises were to familiarize operational and technical 
personnel with procedures to be used for SMC. There were no safety occurrences in these 5 
trials, however there are some human factors issues to be aware of including (1)  incorrect 
selection of a button on the COMPAD; (2) the Out of the Window view operates via a single 
shared mouse pointer which, from time to time, resulted in one Controller waiting for the 
other to manoeuvre the Zoom Camera; (3) in a local Tower environment the AMC and SMC 
can easily monitor each other’s activities whereas in this exercise it was more difficult; (4) the 
working relationship between the SMC and AMC requires more intercom work. It is unlikely 
that in a future operation the AMC and SMC would be in a different location.  
4.2.2 Batch-2 live trials:  The second batch comprising exercises 6 to exercise 20 were to 
demonstrate the applicability of integrating both SMC and AMC with incrementally 
increasing traffic movements and mixing arrivals and departures at both Cork and Shannon 
airports. The suitability of the equipment has been assessed with a number of comments. 
During this phase the simultaneous scenario (Cork and Shannon) was introduced with low 
traffic movements. There were no safety occurrences in these 15 trials, however there are 
some potential risks to be aware of including (1) difficulty in seeing small aircraft and rapid 
climbing aircraft; (2) increased workload as a result of increased simultaneous tasks; (3) the 
level of service is different to a local tower operations adding pressures to ATCOs; (4) 
distractions due to multiple airports and multiple tasks; (5) quality of services might vary 
under operational conditions. 
4.2.3 Batch-3 live trials: The third batch comprising exercise number 21 to exercise 50 built 
on the experience gained from previous exercises with increased traffic as appropriate in the 
sequenced and simultaneous scenarios. MRTO procedures in the previous batches were 
assessed with no additional procedure changes or amendments being required. However 
potential changes were discussed to operating methods in any future RTC environment such 
as better cooperation between airports involved in a Multiple Tower Operation whereby 
vehicle activity at each airport is coordinated so as to manage the workload of the MRTO 
controllers. Again, there were no safety occurrences in these 30 trials, however there are some 
potential risks to be aware of including (1) optimum traffic movements must be determined; 
(2) contingency plans for single ATCO performing multiple tower operations in the event of 
ATCO incapacitation for example; (3) set up of CWP in the RTC; (4) understanding the 
differences between ‘in sequence’ and ‘simultaneously’. 
Table 6. Summary of operational exercises based on the 50 live exercises 
Objectives of 
Exercises 
Criteria Results of Exercise 
1. To evaluate the 
human 
performance 
related to 
Human-
Computer 
Interaction 
(HCI) in a 
sequenced or 
simultaneous 
scenario. 
Human performance and 
human factors have been 
measured and assessed 
for ‘in sequence’ and 
‘simultaneous’ scenarios 
There were two minor HF issues (1) The other 
minor issue was the Controller, on one 
occasion, made an incorrect selection of a 
button on the COMPAD; (2) The Mouse 
pointer in the Out of the Window view is a 
shared mouse pointer which, from time to 
time, resulted in one Controller waiting for the 
other to manoeuvre the Zoom Camera. 
However, with practice during the trials the 
Controllers became adept at co-ordinating the 
use of the mouse. 
2. To identify 
shortcomings 
and limitations 
in order to 
identify 
corrective 
actions 
required before 
next batch of 
exercises 
Any shortcomings and 
limitations have been 
identified and assessed 
and detailed for further 
examination. 
In local Tower the AMC and SMC can easily 
monitor each other’s activities whereas in this 
exercise it was more difficult. This presented a 
change in the working relationship between the 
SMC and AMC in terms of more intercom 
work was required. It is unlikely that in a 
future operation the AMC and SMC would be 
in a different location. However more 
evaluation would be required on this impact if 
this was to become the normal situation. 
3. To demonstrate 
that the full 
range of ATS 
as provided 
from on-site 
control towers 
can be 
provided 
without 
The tasks and duties of 
the ATCO providing 
services from the RTC 
have been measured and 
assessed in line with the 
developed procedures to 
ensure that there was no 
degradation of service 
when providing a 
As observed in the exercises 6 to 20 there are 
obvious differences between the Local Tower 
Operation and the RTC Operation. This mainly 
relates to the fact that the view from the Local 
Tower is better than the RTC. Some examples 
of this are: In exercise 10, the EFS is a 
fantastic tool with measurable safety benefits 
that the current paper strips don’t provide. In 
exercise 15 there is a discussion about the 
degradation 
from the RTC 
service from the RTC. difficulty in seeing smaller aircraft. In exercise 
16 there is a discussion about rapid climbing 
aircraft. In exercise 17 there is a discussion 
about challenging lighting conditions. 
4. To evaluate the 
human 
performance 
from the 
ATCO’s and 
other human 
operators 
perspective in a 
sequenced or 
simultaneous 
scenario. 
Human performance and 
human factors have been 
measured and assessed 
for ‘in sequence’ and 
‘simultaneous’ scenarios 
related to attention 
distributions, situation 
awareness and perceived 
workload during 
performing multiple 
remote tower operations 
Controllers are conscious of the fact that due to 
multiple tasks having to be done at the same 
time that the level of service is not the same as 
in the Local Tower and this adds to the 
pressure on the RTC ATCO. The main reason 
for this is that the Controller knows that if he 
was just performing a task for a single airport 
that e.g. this Vehicle would not have been 
delayed but because he was engaged in another 
task for the other airport he is delaying 
something in the other airport. This is alien to 
the Controllers because they would be used to 
very rarely having to delay replying to a 
Vehicle when Operating in the Local Tower.  
5. To demonstrate 
the state of 
readiness of the 
remote tower 
initiative for 
industrialisatio
n in the case of 
ATS provision 
for multiple 
airports 
An assessment of the 
live trial demonstrations 
to support the proof of 
concept and readiness 
for industrialisation of 
remote towers for 
multiple airports has 
been conducted and 
assessed as positive. 
The document “LSD 02 04 IAA Remote 
Tower System Operational Evaluation” 
(Annex 3 to this report) provides the project 
teams full assessment of the state of readiness 
of the systems provided for the provision of 
ATS provision for multiple airports. The 
document lists a number of suggestions for 
changes to systems which should be 
considered in advance of any potential future 
deployment. 
6. To assess the 
demonstration 
exercises with 
respect to 
sequencing and 
metering to 
support ‘in 
sequence’ and 
‘simultaneous’ 
operations. 
The application of 
sequencing and metering 
processes as applied to 
two airports was 
measured and assessed. 
As outlined in Batch 3 the project team have 
gained a very good understanding of what is 
possible in a Multiple airport ‘in sequence’ and 
‘simultaneous’ aircraft operations. The new 
technology of PTZ, OTW and EFS did 
facilitate ATCOs task performance on multiple 
remote tower operations (exercises 46, 47, 48). 
 
 
5. Discussion of Large Scale Demonstration (LSD) 
The emergence of multiple remote tower operations is due in part to the changing operational 
environment in air transportation which had rapid expansion by low cost carriers at smaller 
airports. Cost constraints required ANSPs to develop new concepts and new technologies to 
fit the new business environment. The management of incoming and outgoing traffic at 
airports is a major function of ATCOs who follow procedures and guidance established by 
past practice, industry guidelines and regulatory policies. The operational procedures seek to 
ensure the safety while enabling efficiency operations (MacLean, Richman, & MacLean, 
2016). The demonstration of 50 live trial exercises represented real-time, dynamic air traffic 
operations at both Cork and Shannon airports and demonstrated multiple remote tower 
operations had no degradation in safety levels, no negative impact on capacity and human 
performance (European Aviation Safety Agency, 2015a; SESAR Joint Undertaking, 2013). 
Based on the results of these trials, the visual target tracking design of remote tower systems 
enables the automatic tracking moving objects such as vehicles/persons/animals on the 
manoeuvring area and aircraft in the air. This new technology has contributed to improved 
visual acquisition and has improved ATCOs’ situational awareness. 
5.1 New Technology Induced Unexpected Visual Behaviours related to HCI 
It was observed that depth perception was a potential issue (exercises 15, 16 & 17) in the RTC, 
as it was easier to judge the position of an aircraft in relation to another aircraft from the local 
tower than the RTC (Howard, 2012).  When a single controller is responsible for four tower 
roles AMC/SMC in two airports, there is a requirement to actively use four frequencies in 
addition to monitoring two separate approach unit frequencies (for situational awareness). 
Consequently, there is an increased likelihood of the controller missing a transmission by an 
aircraft or vehicle (Bailey, Konstan, & Carlis, 2001). The organisation of whole 
communications systems in an RTC needs to be explored further regarding Human-Computer 
Interactions with EFS, RDP, OTW and TEL impacting to ATCO’s visual response, auditory 
response, spoken response, manual response and cognitive processing information.  
The visual presentation of remote tower system in relation to the HCI functions shall not 
exceed the 1,000 millisecond of end-to-end delay in order to fit the requirements of safety 
assessment (European Aviation Safety Agency, 2015a). The results of eye tracking data 
analysis demonstrated the average fixation durations on OTW (275 ms), EFS (232 ms) and 
RDP (269 ms) for the scenario of aircraft in sequence departing and landing to Cork (table 5). 
The relationship of human information processing and complexity of operational tasks are 
related to the length of fixation duration (K. Rayner, 1998; Singh & Singh, 2012). The 
fixation duration is related to the amount of information processing (K. Rayner, 1998; Singh 
& Singh, 2012). When a single controller is managing two simultaneous arrivals into two 
different airports, EFS is the shortest fixation duration (232 ms), it may be the contribution of 
the comprehensive interface design. On the other side, the long fixation duration is on the 
TEL (293ms) which might be due to the complicated operational requirement to monitor so 
many radio frequencies at two airports. Furthermore, saccade is defined as fast eye movement 
between fixations and generally it declines as a function of increased mental workload 
(Ahlstrom & Friedman-Berg, 2006). The results reveal that saccade amplitude has significant 
interaction between AOIs and tasks performance. The TEL display consists of a screen with 
buttons and small digital numbers of radio frequencies used by all moving aircraft, vehicles 
and other parties on both Cork and Shannon airports. ATCO’s must pay attention to select the 
correct frequency to communicate safely. 
The view of OTW displays objects at a smaller size compared to the object size when viewed 
from the Local Tower, this results in it being difficult to see smaller objects far away from the 
camera. For areas of the airfield such as runway incursion hotspots further than 1.5KM from 
the cameras continuous use of the PTZ is required to get a clear view of the area. When two 
controllers were working in the RTC, as AMC or SMC controllers, at times both controllers 
required the use of the PTZ, due to current system design simultaneous interaction with 
another different PTZ was not possible and created a situation where one controller was not 
able to use PTZ. The interaction with PTZ and EFS (figure 6) is a new HCI issue which and 
might increase workload for ATCOs, an induced workload by MRTO which does not exist in 
Local Towers to the same extent, i.e. PTZ is used more frequently than binoculars (Marchitto, 
Benedetto, Baccino, & Canas, 2016). In order to try to mitigate and reduce this workload in 
future MRTO, the IAA had discussed system revisions on PTZ manipulation with the supplier 
including: (1) Automatic PTZ tracking of certain Objects as determined by the controller; (2) 
Explore HMI adjustments to the PTZ manipulation; (3) Hotspot Cameras set up on targeted 
distant areas of the airfield displayed permanently on separate displays.  
 
 
Figure 6. ATCO’s fixation duration on the EFS and OTW with PTZ recorded by Eye Tracker                                        
to investigate HCI functions and Human Performance on RTM 
 
5.2 Impact on Safety 
The certification of Innovative remote tower systems has to evaluate human information 
processing at initial operational stage to assure improved operators’ situation awareness, and 
safety (Satterfield, McCauley, Caldwell, & Dongen, 2016). To conduct live exercises of 
multiple remote tower operations, the safety case has to be approved by regulators. The IAA 
mandated a fundamental principle which required that MRTO operations must maintain at 
least the same level of safety of operations as that which local tower operation provides. The 
safety case provided the evidence, arguments and assumptions to support this principle.  
During the trials the air traffic controllers and the RTC project team were governed by the 
same safety management policies, principles and procedures that exist in the Local Tower 
operations. Tower controllers are responsible for the safety and efficiency of the air 
movements and ground movements. Therefore, the monitoring of traffic within the control 
zone by ATCO’s visual attention resources is an important safety mechanism (Papenfuss & 
Friedrich, 2016). There were no safety occurrences during the 50 live exercises where there 
was a reduction in safety barriers which was not anticipated or provided for during the Safety 
Case development and update. When an AMC is managing two simultaneous arrivals into two 
different airports, ideally the first landing aircraft should be stable on the runway before the 
second arrival aircraft is 1NM from touchdown at the other aerodrome. However, OTW has 
the longest fixation duration for SMC due to the complexity of aircraft and vehicle 
movements.  A Single ATCO performing simultaneous AMC and SMC functions is the 
biggest challenge within MRTO, as RDP and OTW show long fixation durations on multiple 
tasks.  
To ensure the safety of operations by a single ATCO performing simultaneous departures at 
two different airports, it is suggested that additional time and distance between aircraft cleared 
for take-off and landing is implemented. This is because it is good practice that ATCOs  
monitor the critical phases of aircraft flight during initial roll and rotation and during the 
landing and rollout. There is a need to conduct further investigation of ATCO’s visual 
attention related to situation awareness and HCI in the future. The project team concluded 
therefore that there was no adverse impact on safety while conducting the Remote Tower 
Trials from the RTC and conditions for the grant of project acceptance by the NSA were 
successfully maintained. The live trial exercises demonstrated that the ATS provided by the 
RTC for a single airport and two medium airports by a single controller with ‘in sequence’ 
and ‘simultaneous’ aircraft operation was at least as safe as the ATS provided by the Local 
Towers at both Cork and Shannon aerodromes. No safety occurrence was reported nor did any 
operational safety issue arise during the conduct of the fifty live trial exercises. Based on the 
live exercises as per the demonstration Plan, the objective of no degradation in safety levels 
between remote and local tower operations was achieved.  
 
5.3 Impact on Capacity 
In advance of commencing the Remote Tower trials, it was agreed that there would be little or 
no change to, or deviation from the air traffic services that the aircraft operators would 
normally experience when these services were provided from the Local Towers. In addition, 
when the RTC had control of the Shannon and Cork AMC positions, predicted traffic was 
constantly monitored to determine if and when the two AMC positions could be merged. On 
occasion when the two AMC positions were merged and controlled by a single controller it 
was necessary to ensure that ATCO didn’t suffer from high workload and consequently 
impact safety and capacity. The control of a single Local Tower with both SMC and AMC 
positions from an RTC was applicable for the levels of traffic in the exercise scenarios. In 
advance of the positions being combined there were seven scheduled arrivals to the two 
airports in addition to a number of VFR aircraft. This situation initially increased ATCO’s 
workload when operating AMC for two airports. Although the benefit of remote tower 
provision of ATC services for multiple remote towers was predicted to increase efficiency by 
60% at some locations (Ziegler, 2016), it might have trade-off effects through increased 
ATCO’s perceived workload when performing multiple tasks. Exercise-32 demonstrated that 
two ‘in sequence’ arrival flights into the two airports were manageable but it was noted that 
there was potential for delay at one airport due to activities at the other airport, particularly if 
that activities are unexpected or non-routine. The measurement of pupil dilation has been used 
to investigate the status of cognitive processes and mental workload, as pupil diameter 
increases as an indication of cognitive demand (Ahlstrom & Friedman-Berg, 2006). The 
results revealed that TEL is the highest pupil dilation (85.23 pixels), followed by RDP (81.46 
pixels), OTW (79.57 pixels) and EFS (77.06 pixels). The controller managed his workload in 
the exercise and was able to prioritise which work had to be done and which work could wait 
while interacted with RTM (Kearney, Li, & Lin, 2016). 
Operating innovative technology of RTM to maintain safe separation of aircraft both in the air 
and on the ground is not only an issue of technical skill performance but also of real-time 
decision-making involving situation awareness and risk management within a time-limited 
environment (Li, 2011). There may be a time lag based with MRTO compared to Local 
Tower operations, due to low cloud and moisture impacting the cameras and not impacting 
the Local Tower. For future application, workload resilience must be monitored to ensure that 
unplanned, unexpected aircraft such as Search and Rescue Helicopters can be accommodated 
without delay. Based on the exercises in the Demonstration Plan, there was no significant 
negative impact on capacity on multiple remote tower operations (table 7). 
Table 7: The summary of Demonstration Plan of live exercises reflect to Capacity 
Leading organization Irish Aviation Authority 
Demonstration exercise objectives The High level objective is to verify: 
 System Capability & Suitability 
 Operational CONOPS & Procedures Fine Tuning 
 Measurements for “In Sequence” Operations 
continue. 
 Initial measurements for “Simultaneous” Operations 
High-level description of the Concept of 
Operations 
These exercises will introduce aircraft in the air controlled 
by AMC at the RTC for the two airports. 
The AMC will be done by the RTC for both airports.  
The SMC will control the ground traffic at both airports. 
Applicable Operational Context  Cork & Shannon airport  
 All SMC (Surface Movements OPS) 
 All Aircraft controlled by AMC at the RTC for both 
airports in light traffic i.e. <3 aircraft for both 
airports. 
 Perform initial analysis on other influencing factors 
such as Daylight & poor weather conditions. 
Impact on Capacity Capacity: No negative impact on Capacity or traffic that can 
be handled in this mode. 
Cost efficiency: Document initial results for a single ATCO 
performing the task which today is performed by two 
ATCOs 
 
5.4 Impact on Human Performance 
Air traffic control is a complex cognitive task, it involves perceived information, processing 
information and decision-making (Papenfuss & Friedrich, 2016). During the trials a number 
of human factor issues were encountered, most of which were anticipated (e.g. the operation 
of new equipment and associated HCI) and some which were not anticipated such as the level 
of noise in the RTC when a single controller was operating four frequencies and monitoring 
an additional two frequencies. Multiple Remote Tower Operations might be a good solution 
for increasing safety and capacity of ATS at small/medium airports. There was a trend of 
increasing ATCO’s performance with by-products of also increasing workload on multiple 
remote tower operations compared to local tower operations. Current research supports 
previous findings that ATCO mental effort increased and detection performance deteriorated 
with the numbers of controlled airports (Oehme, Leitner & Wittbrodt, 2013). There is a 
requirement to address the issue of controllers’ perceived workload while performing MRTO 
either by training, additional staffing or designing new standard operating procedures or 
interface design (European Aviation Safety Agency, 2015c; SESAR Joint Undertaking, 2013, 
2015b), as workload can negatively affect a controller’s situation awareness and increase the 
potential for error. However, suitable human-cantered design RTM including OTW, EFS & 
PTZ systems can significantly improve controllers’ situation awareness and reduce their 
cognitive workload (Laois & Giannacourou, 1995; Tobaruela et al., 2014), and increase their 
capability to process the information (Wickens, Miller, & Tham, 1996). Ideally the first 
landing aircraft should be steady on the Runway before the second arrival aircraft is 1NM 
from touchdown at the other aerodrome in Multiple Airport Simultaneous Operations 
(MASO). It was noted that meeting this guideline may be difficult when controlling aircraft of 
varying approach speeds. Recommendation in this area in the future may be supported by an 
additional caveat which would give the controller the authority to exercise professional 
judgement with regard to the issuance of a landing clearance to the second arriving aircraft.  
Previous research had demonstrated that significant benefits were achievable by the field 
trials (Simaiakis, Khadilkar, Balakrishnan, Reynolds, & Hansman, 2014). 
A framework of situation awareness based on information-processing model which proposed 
situation awareness as ‘the perception of the elements in the environment within a volume of 
time and space, the comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of their status in the 
future’ related to task performance (Endsley, 1995). ATCO’s visual behaviours provide an 
opportunity to investigate the relationship between eye movement patterns and task 
performance. Eye scan pattern is one of the most powerful methods for assessing human 
beings’ cognitive processes (Ahlstrom & Friedman-Berg, 2006). The air traffic flows of Cork 
and Shannon were combined in a data set describing traffic situation, consisting of time, type 
of event and time distance. Only data sets with time distances less than 60 seconds were 
regarded as valid ‘simultaneously’ condition. Whilst the landing is represented in the flight 
movement data by a single timestamp, the actual process of landing occupies the ATCO’s 
attention longer by monitoring closely the final approach until the aircraft touches down and 
stabilises on the runway. Therefore, two aircraft landing within the 60 second time span can 
be considered as simultaneous in respect of the monitoring task of the controller (Schier, 
Papenfuss, Lorenz, Walther, & Moehlenbrink, 2011). Based on the exercises of 
Demonstration Plan, there was no negative impact on human performance on multiple remote 
tower operations. 
 
6. Conclusion and Recommendation 
The implementation of multiple remote tower operations is promising as new technologies 
can assist ATCO situation awareness. The findings are valuable for both ATCO training and 
system design. In terms of standardisation, the results of the 50 live demonstrations can 
provide feedback to EUROCAE WG-100 “Remote and Virtual Towers” (EUROCAE, 2016) 
in developing standards for both single and multiple modes of remote towers systems for 
adoption by ICAO as standards and recommended practices. There were no safety occurrence 
reports nor did any operational safety issue arise during the conduct of the fifty live trial 
exercises. However, there are some issues to be aware of for future implementation, including 
the impact of monitoring different radio frequencies and perceived workload.  Workload 
management in the provision of ATS for multiple towers is a new challenge for air traffic 
controllers, and practice is required to balance the workload by distributing tasks more evenly 
where possible. Multiple remote tower operations show potential as an alternative to 
traditional Local Towers. The novelty and flexibility of the advanced technology allows 
regulators to be creative in adapting operations to fit safety regulations,  it also has the 
potential to fundamentally change the way operators provide ATS. From a regulatory 
perspective the results of these live trials may contribute to EASA rulemaking activity for 
single and multiple airports remote tower operations.  
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